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forms of income of the same general class as other forms
of income on which such unreasonable burdens are not
placed. It is submitted that a particularly glaring example
of this is found in the classification of ground rent income
as "investment income" and of ordinary rent from real
estate as "ordinary income"."'
(5) The Maryland Act is in the form of the classified
variety which, though not a form untried in other jurisdictions, is nevertheless comparatively seldom found,
largely due to the fact that it is generally felt that the
graduated net income tax is more closely
geared to ability
82
to pay than the classified income tax.
The conclusion is inescapable from a study of income
tax laws of other states that, generally speaking, the Maryland Act is not in harmony with other state income tax
statutes. Most income taxes are levied on the theory that
those best able to contribute to the support of the government should be those most heavily taxed. The powers responsible for the Maryland Act seem to have lost sight of
this cardinal principle of income taxation in their effort to
discard the intangible property tax and "soak" the ground
rent owner. It is submitted that radical modifications of
the Maryland Act along the lines suggested are in order.8 8
THE VESTING OF REMAINDERS AND
THEIR ALIENABILITY
Bishop v. Horney'
Hans v. Sale Deposit & Trust Co.2
In the first principal case the testatrix devised certain
realty to her three daughters for life with remainders to
their issue, but in event of the death of any daughter without issue her share should go to the surviving daughters or
daughter, with a gift over in event of the death of all three
daughters without issue. There was also a provision that
should any daughter leave a child surviving at the time
of her death, but the child should die before reaching the
81 See supra n. 55.

"See supra circa n. 55 ff.
"The Tax Revision Commission of 1939 is scheduled to file a report
with the Governor on or before December 1st, 1940, recommending modifications in the Act.
1177 Md. 353, 9 A. (2d) 597 (1939).
'12 A. (2d) 208 (Md. 1940).
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age of 21, its share should be distributed as if the child
had never lived. In 1924, after two of the daughters had
died without issue, the surviving daughter and her four
adult children executed a mortgage upon this real estate
to the Centreville National Bank, of which appellees subsequently became trustees. In 1931 appellant obtained a
judgment against one of these children. In 1936 the surviving daughter died leaving her four children as her sole
issue. Subsequently, appellant claimed a portion of the
proceeds, realized in the sale of this land under partition
proceedings, to satisfy his judgment. He contended that
the remainder to the issue of the surviving daughter was
contingent as to the takers until the death of this daughter
in 1936, and thus the mortgage, under which appellees
claim, was void under the principle that remainders contingent as to the person are inalienable.8 From a decree in favor of the appellees the appellant appealed. Held: Decree
affirmed, on the construction of the remainder to the issue
as being vested during the life estate of the surviving
daughter and therefore fully alienable in 1924.
In the second principal case the testator devised realty
and personalty to defendant-appellee in trust for the use
and benefit of testator's widow, sister, and his children
during their lives, and after the death of the last survivor
to be equally divided among the testator's grandchildren
then living, together with the lawful issue of any dead
grandchild. In 1916 before the death of the last surviving
life tenant, the plaintiff-appellant, being one of the testator's grandchildren, executed a deed purporting to convey
all of her interest in this realty and personalty to defendant-appellee upon certain trusts. In 1927 the last surviving life tenant died, and the defendant-appellee then instituted a suit in equity to determine the persons entitled to
the remainder. A decree was entered dividing the remainder among nineteen grandchildren then living, and
directing that the share of the plaintiff-appellant be paid to
the defendant-appellee as trustee under the deed of trust
of 1916 executed by plaintiff-appellant. Plaintiff-appellant
was a party to this proceeding and entered a written consent to the decree. For ten years defendant-appellee carried out this trust, paying the income to plaintiff-appellant
under its terms. In 1938 plaintiff-appellant filed her bill
of complaint seeking to have her deed of trust executed in

3

See Reno, Alienability. and Tranamissibility of Future Interests in
Maryland (1938) 2 Md. L. R. 89, 91 for a full discussion of this principle
as developed by the Maryland decisions
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1916 annulled on the ground that at the time of its execution her interest in the realty and personalty was merely a
contingent remainder, and, being contingent as to the person, was inalienable. From a decree in favor of the defendant-appellee, the plaintiff-appellant appealed. Held:
Decree affirmed on the grounds (1) that the remainder to
the testator's grandchildren then living should be construed to create a vested remainder in the grandchildren
of the testator living at his death, subject to being opened
to let in after-born grandchildren, and subject to divestment as to the share of each grandchild by his or her death
prior to the death of the last surviving life tenant, and
therefore, as a vested remainder, was alienable as to the
share of plaintiff-appellant in 1916; and (2) that the decree
of 1927 was res adjudicata as to the validity of the deed
of trust executed by plaintiff-appellant in 1916.
In both cases the Court of Appeals was presented with
the opportunity to re-examine the rule established in In re
Banks' Will,4 that a remainder contingent as to the person
is inalienable although a remainder contingent as to an
event is fully alienable. In each the contingency, if any
existed, went to the ascertainment of the taker, and therefore if the remainders were contingent, as contended, they
were contingent as to the person and inalienable under
this rule. However, in both cases a decision as to the
soundness of this distinction was avoided by construing
the remainders as vested.
In the Bishop case the possible contingency contended
for by the appellant was the implication of an implied condition precedent of survival until the death of the life tenant, raised from the use of the term "issue" to describe the
remaindermen. If such a condition precedent of survival
could be implied, it would operate as a condition precedent
to the ascertainment of the takers, and therefore render
the remainder contingent as to the person. Survival until
the death of the life tenant would have become part of the
class description, so that during the continuance of the life
tenant's life her children or grandchildren would not have
held vested interests, but would have been merely prospective class members who would have been required to
survive their mother in order to enter the class to which
the remainder was devised. This contention was rejected
by construing the remainder to "issue" as identical with a
remainder to "children", and therefore vested, subject to
'87 Md. 425, 40 A. 268 (1898).
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opening to let in after-born children, as to all those children
who were in esse at the death of the testator. Under this
construction the vested interests of these four children of
the life tenant would not have been defeated by their subsequent deaths either with or without issue during the
continuance of the life estate. The only defeasible characteristics of their vested interests were their ability to
decrease in size to let in after-born children and the express provision that death before attaining the age of 21,
either before or after the death of the life tenant, would
operate as a condition subsequent divesting each child's
share over to the others.
This construction of a remainder to "issue" of the life
tenant as being identical with a remainder to "children"
of the life tenant5 is contrary to the position assumed by
the Restatement of Property to the effect that the word
"issue" or "descendants" of a person not deceased normally
creates a requirement of survival to the death of such
person.6 In other words, a remainder to the "issue" of the
life tenant implies a condition of survival to the same
extent that a remainder to the "heirs of the body" of the
life tenant does. However, the Restatement of Property
does take the position that this condition of survival is
normally construed to be a condition subsequent rather
than a condition precedent, and therefore a gift to the
"issue" of the life tenant will create a vested remainder
in the issue during the life of such life tenant subject to
defeasance by death prior to the life tenant.7 If the Court
of Appeals had adopted this rule of the Restatement, the
four adult children would not have held indefeasibly
vested interests in this remainder subject only to opening
to let in after-born children when the mortgage was executed in 1924, but would have held interests which were
vested subject to complete defeasance by failure to survive
5 This construction is supported by Haab v. Schneeberger, 147 Mich. 583,
111 N. W. 185 (1907) (where the remainder was to the "issue share and
share alike") ; French v. Logan's Adm'r, 108 Va. 67, 60 S. E. 622 (1908)
In re Reed's Estate, Appeal of Biggan, 307 Pa. 482, 161 A. 729 (1932).
. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) Vol. 3, Sec. 249, and Comment (i).
The following cases support the Restatement in construing a gift to
"issue" as implying non-survival as a condition subsequent: Eaton v.
Eaton, 88 Conn. 286, 91 A. 196 (1914); Stamford Trust Co. v. Lockwood,
98 Conn. 337, 119 A. 218 (1922); Kennard v. Kennard, 81 N. H. 509, 129
A. 725 (1925) ; Com'r. v. Alford, 282 Mass. 113, 184 N. E. 437 (1933). On
the other hand, the following cases construed a gift to "issue" as implying
survival as a condition precedent: Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374, 26
N. E. 1112 (1891) ; Twaites v. Waller, 133 Iowa 84, 110 N. W. 279 (1907) ;
Graff v. Rankin, 250 Fed. 150 (C. C. A., 5th, 1917) ; Greenwich Trust Co.
v. Shively, 110 Conn. 117, 147 A. 367 (192.9).
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their mother, the life tenant. Such a construction would
then have raised the question of whether alienability
should be made to depend upon whether survival is treated
as a condition precedent or a condition subsequent. In
either case the interest of the "issue" during the continuance of the life estate would have been subject to the contingency of death before the life tenant as well as to a decrease in size by the subsequent birth of additional children. Yet according to the rule of In re Bank's Will" the
interest will be alienable if non-survival is a condition subsequent but inalienable if survival is a condition precedent.
Does such a rule, which makes alienability depend upon a
play of words where the tenuous character of the interest
is the same under either construction, belong in the jurisprudence of Maryland?
This question was answered in the affirmative in the
Hans case, where the words "then living" were construed
to make non-survival a condition subsequent. There the
gift in remainder to the testator's grandchildren "then living" at the death of the last surviving life tenant was construed to create a vested remainder in the grandchildren
of the testator at his death, subject to opening to let in
after-born grandchildren, and subject to complete defeasance as to each grandchild by his or her death before the
last surviving life tenant. The entire discussion by the
Court in its opinion, as to whether this was a vested or contingent remainder, rested upon the assumption that if survival was a condition precedent the interests of these
grandchildren were contingent as to the person during the
continuance of the life estate and therefore inalienable.
Instead of questioning the soundness of such a distinction,
the Court avoided its application by making the unusual
construction of the words "then living" as a condition subsequent.9 No words expressly making survival a condition
are more indicative of an intention to make it a condition
I Supra n. 4.
9 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) Vol. 3, Sec. 250, states that the words
In
"then living" tend to establish survival as a condition precedent.
Reid v. Walbach, 75 Md. 205, 23 A. 472 (1892), "then living" was construed
as a condition precedent. To the same effect see Lansdale v. Linthicum, 139
Md. 155, 115 A. 116 (1921), where the Court stated: "While the law favors
the early vesting of estates, the settled rule is that the testator has the
right to fix the period of vesting, and to make it depend upon a contingency,
and when he has done this with reasonable certainty, his wishes will prevail and the estate will not vest until the happening of the contingency. The
testatrix having by her will fixed the death of her husband as the time
for the vesting of the remainders, and having described those who were
to take at that time as such of her children as were then living and the
issue of any deceased child, only those coming within that description
at the death of her husband can take under the will."
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precedent than the phrase "then living", 10 yet under the
general policy of the law in favor of the early vesting of
estates the Court felt justified in construing these words
as making non-survival a condition subsequent.
The underlying significance of this decision lies in the
tacit admission by the Court that, where a person need
only survive to a future date, i. e., the death of the life
tenant, in order to take an estate in possession, he has a
sufficient probability of taking such estate that his interest
should be alienable. Whether we call it a contingent remainder or a vested remainder subject to complete defeasance, the tenuous character of the interest is the same
if the only contingency which will prevent the person
enjoying the possession of his interest is his failure to survive the life tenant. In either case his share is subject
to decrease by birth of after-born grandchildren, and to the
non-happening of the same event, namely, his death before
the life tenant. To hold one alienable and the other inalienable is to sanctify the word "vested". The only real
basis for denying alienability to a future interest is because
of its highly tenuous character. Therefore if its tenuous
character is the same whether survival is construed to be a
condition precedent or a condition subsequent, then alienability should not be made to depend upon whether a court
shall elect to call it vested subject to complete defeasance
rather than contingent.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals passed by an excellent opportunity in the Hans case for examining the
true basis for the inalienability of certain types of future
interests. If this question is to continue to depend upon
the artificial distinction between vested and contingent
remainders, then in each case the Court of Appeals has
within its own hands the absolute power to determine
alienability by merely electing to treat a clause requiring
survival as a condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent. If "then living" can be treated in one case
as a condition subsequent thereby rendering the interest
alienable and as a condition precedent rendering it inalienable in the next case, how can a lawyer advise his client in
10In GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3rd ed. 1915) Sec. 108 it is said
that "if the conditional element is incorporated into the description of, or
Into the gift to the remainderman, then the remainder is contingent; but
if, after words giving a vested interest, a clause is added divesting it, tie
remainder is vested. Thus on a devise to A. for life, remainder to his
children, but if any child dies in the lifetime of A his share to go to
those who survive, the share of each child is vested subject to be divested.
But on a devise to A for life, remainder to such of his children as survive
him, the remainder Is contingent."
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advance? Probably the only sound solution of this problem
is the rule of the Restatement of Property1' that remainders and executory interests, whether vested or contingent, are fully alienable; and that "the tenuousness of
the remainder or executory interest is material only in
determining the value and constituent characteristics
of
12
the interest acquired by the transferee.'
AUTO OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED
BY GUEST PERMITTED TO DRIVE
Powers v. State, use of Reynolds'
At midnight, on November 11, 1938, Raymond Coffman,
Paul E. Powers, and Mary M. Reynolds left a Hagerstown
night club for Hancock, Maryland, from whence they had
motored earlier in the evening in a car owned by Powers.
During the evening each member of the party had drunk
a quantity of intoxicating liquor. Before leaving for Hancock, therefore, they all agreed to the common proposal
of letting Coffman drive the Powers car, the reason being that Powers himself was in no fit condition to drive.
On the return trip the car, while being operated by Coffman, struck a guard rail; and as a result Miss Reynolds
was killed. In an action brought under the Maryland
version of Lord Campbell's Act, the plaintiff was successful, and the verdict was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In its majority opinion,2 the Court ruled that Miss Reynolds
was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law in riding with a driver whom she knew had been drinking during the evening, and that the automobile owner
who requests or allows another to drive the car while
the owner occupies it is liable for any damage caused by
the driver's negligence in the absence of proof that the
owner abandoned the right of control.
It would seem evident that Maryland follows the weight
of authority in this country in ruling that Miss Reynolds
was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law in riding in a car driven by an intoxicated driver. The
courts are loath to hold, in any instance, an invited guest
21

12

See. 162.
Ibid, Comment (d).

11 A. (2d) 909 (Md.1940).
The decision of the Court rested on the views of three Judges. A
minority opinion, representing the views of two judges, was also filed.

